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Abstract
Roald Hoffmann and other theorists claim that we we ought to use
highly idealized chemical models (“qualitative models”) in order to in-
crease our understanding of chemical phenomena, even though other
models are available which make more highly accurate predictions. I
assess this norm by examining one of the tradeoffs faced by model
builders and model users — the tradeoff between precision and gener-
ality. After arguing that this tradeoff obtains in many cases, I discuss
how the existence of this tradeoff can help us defend Hoffmann’s norm
for modelling.
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1 Qualitative Models in Chemistry
Roald Hoffmann and other chemists have claimed that highly idealized mod-
els are extremely important and probably indispensable for chemical expla-
nations.1 Such highly idealized or “qualitative” models are often contrasted
with “quantitative” models, which are more predictively accurate. The dis-
tinction between qualitative and quantitative models is not about the use of
numbers; both types of models can be numerical. Rather it is a distinction
resting on degrees of approximation and idealization. Qualitative models
contain more approximations and are more highly idealized than quanti-
tative models.2 This contrast is especially striking in the literature about
molecular and electronic structure. Increases in computational power have
given chemists the ability to calculate the electronic structure of small and
medium sized molecules with incredible accuracy using quantitative models.
Theorists who emphasize the need for qualitative models acknowledge the
importance and achievements of the quantitative modelling tradition, but
emphasize the continuing need for qualitative models to increase our under-
standing of chemical phenomena. Qualitative models of molecular structure
1This argument can be found in Hoffmann’s (1998) and (1995). One of the classic exam-
ples of the use of qualitative models in chemical explanations can be found in Hoffmann’s
joint work with Woodward on pericyclic reactions (Woodward & Hoffmann, 1970).
2Although I will be treating the qualitative/quantiative distinction as a distinction
about kinds of models, there is another way to render the distinction. Hoffmann and his
philosophical allies sometimes apply the qualitative/quantiative distinction to the practice
and goals of modelling. For example, Hoffmann has claimed that the kind of models he
relies on in his research exemplify “qualitative thinking” about chemical problems. In
(Weisberg, ms), I discuss the goal version of this distinction in greater detail.
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are rarely able to make highly accurate predictions about molecular geom-
etry; however, they are thought to explain why molecules have the shapes
that they do.
One of the clearest statements of the continuing need for qualitative mod-
els comes from a recent physical organic chemistry textbook. Felix Carroll
writes:
Why then don’t we just talk about high-level theoretical calcula-
tions and ignore the simple theory? We must choose the model
that is sufficiently accurate for our computational purposes, yet
still simple enough that we have some understanding of what
the model describes. Otherwise, the model is a black box, and
we have no understanding of what it does, perhaps even no idea
whether the answers it produces are physically reasonable. (Car-
roll, 1998, my emphasis)
In this passage, Carroll asserts a connection between building qualitative
models and an increase in explanatory power.3
Before we can analyze the connection between idealization and explana-
tion in greater detail, we need to know what Carroll, Hoffmann, and others
mean by “qualitative models” or “simple models.” These expressions refer
to a number of things including:
3Robin Hendry argues that the use of highly idealized models in chemical contexts goes
back to the earliest days of quantum chemistry. He claims that Coulson advocated the
use of simplified quantum mechanical models in order to generate chemical explanations
that were both plausible and chemically intuitive. (Hendry, ????)
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1. literally simpler models (i.e. ones that have fewer parameters in their
descriptions)
2. models with restrictions on the number of causal factors included
3. models appraised with lower standards of fidelity
4. imprecise model descriptions
While each item on this list may play a role in justifying the claim that
qualitative models are necessary for increasing the explanatory power of
chemistry, I will be confining my discussion to the fourth item — preci-
sion. I will argue that sacrificing precision in model descriptions can often
add explanatory depth to the models picked out by these descriptions. The
defense of this thesis has two parts. First I will argue that there is a tradeoff
between precision and generality. I then suggest that generality is an ex-
planatory virtue. Hence, a more general set of models is a more explanatory
set. Combining these claims together generates the conclusion that imprecise
model descriptions can pick out more explanatory sets of models.
2 Models
Philosophers defending familiar, simple forms of scientific realism have often
argued for a two-place relationship between theoretical representations and
the world. These two relata are connected via correspondence or truth;
a good representation truthfully describes a target system in the world.
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According to these philosophers, understanding the practice of theorizing
in science only requires understanding the structure of theories and the rela-
tionships between theories and the world.
Giere (1988), Cartwright (1983), Lloyd (1994), and other philosophers
have emphasized the inadequacy of this view to capture aspects of modern
theoretical practice. Giere argues that there are not two, but three rele-
vant relata: models, model descriptions, and the world. My own account of
modeling broadly follows Giere on this point.
Model descriptions describe or pick out models. In the case of mathemat-
ical models, model descriptions typically take the form of equations. This is
optional, however, as models can be represented in other ways as well, such as
with pictures, sentences, or computer programs. A single model description
can pick out multiple models, and one model may be described by multiple
descriptions.
Models themselves can be concrete or abstract. Concrete models, such
as model airplanes, are physically constructed. In this paper, however, I will
be discussing abstract or mathematical models. These models consist of a
set of relationships between properties and many show how these properties
change over time. For example, dynamic models of molecular structure show
how molecules stretch, bend, and rotate in time.
Models, both concrete and abstract, need not be related to any target
system in the actual world. It may be theoretically fruitful to study a model
even if it does not describe an actual target system. However, chemists often
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build models with the intention of relating them to actual target systems.
Such models may be used to make predictions about how these systems will
behave and how their component parts give rise to their behavior. When
models relate to target systems, they do so in virtue of their being similar
to these systems in certain respects and degrees (Giere, 1988).
For the purposes of this paper, I will describe a very simple example of
a chemical model: the ball and spring model of covalent bonds. This model
can be used to determine the stretching energy of bonds and is often used
in connection with spectroscopy and semi-empirical calculations of molecular
structure.4 Although this model is used to describe the quantum mechanical
phenomenon of covalent bonding, the model itself is completely classical.
It treats a covalent bond as a spring and atoms as masses at the ends of
the spring. In the simplest version which I will be discussing in this paper,
the spring is treated as a harmonic oscillator; it is an “ideal” spring with no
anharmonic character. These features should make it obvious that the model
contains many kinds of idealizations, although I will only be discussing the
ones having to do with precision.
Ball and spring models are described by the following model description:
Estretch = kb(r − r0)2 (1)
The independent variable in this equation is the distance between the atoms.
4For more information about the use of semi-empirical models in calculating molecular
structure, see (Carroll, 1998), (Carey & Sundberg, 2000), and (Lowry & Richardson, 1987).
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It is expressed as the distance between the atoms (r) minus the equilibrium
distance (r0) so that when the bond is at its equilibrium length, the model
predicts zero stretching energy.
Equation (1) is an uninstantiated model description. An uninstantiated
model description is an equation in which values are not assigned to the
parameters. Instantiating a model description means adding in values for
the parameters.5 We can instantiate the ball and spring model description in
various ways by setting the parameter (kb) to different values. For example:
Estretch = 1.0(r − r0)2 (2)
Estretch = 1.5(r − r0)2 (3)
Estretch = 2.0(r − r0)2 (4)
Each instantiated description picks out a different model from the ball and
spring family.
5I roughly follow Orzack and Sober (1993) in making the distinction between instanti-
ated and uninstantiated model descriptions. The main difference between our accounts is
that Orzack and Sober treat equations as models, whereas I treat them as model descrip-
tions. Thus they distinguish between instantiated and uninstantiated models, whereas I
distinguish between instantiated and uninstantiated model descriptions.
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3 Precision
Precision is a property of model descriptions, not of models themselves.6
Theoreticians sometimes talk about models being more or less precise, but
what they usually mean is that some parameter in an equation is specified
more or less precisely. Model builders’ use of the term “precision” is closely
related to the everyday definition “fineness of specification.”
Comparing the amount of precision in the specification of individual pa-
rameters is relatively straightforward. Compare, for example, the following
two instantiations of the ball and spring stretching model:
Estretch = 1.0± 0.1(r − r0)2 (5)
Estretch = 1.01± 0.01(r − r0)2 (6)
The first instantiation (5) is much less precise than the second (6). Whereas
the first description picks out all of the models with spring constants between
0.9 and 1.1, the second picks out only those models with spring constants
between 0.99 and 1.01. In other words, the second description picks out a
small subset of the models picked out by the first description.
This example suggests a general method of comparing the precision of
two models, which will work when the two sets of models “overlap” as they
6One might worry that precision is neither a property of models nor model descriptions
and argue that it is a property of sets of data. The strict statistical definition of “precision”
does make it a property of data sets. However, there is also a use of the term “precision”
having to do with theoretical representations such as model descriptions. It is this use
which I am trying to capture in this paper.
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do in (5) and (6):
A model description D1 is more precise than a model description
D2 if D1 picks out a proper subset of the models picked out by
D2.
One can add further mathematical sophistication to this relational definition
of precision, but for the purposes of this paper, it will be sufficient to adopt
this simple comparative definition. Giving a more general and non-relational
definition turns out to be somewhat complicated and is beyond the scope of
this paper.7
I can now be a bit more exact about how I individuate models and model
descriptions. Model descriptions can be uninstantiated or instantiated, while
models themselves are determinate sets of relationships between properties.
Uninstantiated model descriptions pick out families of models. If the param-
eters are set with some imprecision, such that they can take a range of values,
then the description will pick out a subset of the models picked out by the
uninstantiated description. When model descriptions are instantiated with
high degrees of precision, they pick out smaller sets of models. If we instan-
tiate the parameters with completely precise values, then the instantiated
description will pick out a single model.
7A more extensive discussion of this issue can be found in (Weisberg, ms).
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4 Generality
We now turn to generality, which is a property of the relationship between
models and target systems. Since I have not given a full account of this
relationship, I will have to rely on an intuitive notion of “applying to” in
order to discuss the tradeoffs involving generality. A model applies to a
target system when it accurately describes the structure and dynamics of the
system according to the standards set by the the model builder or model user.
Although we would need to know more about a model user’s standards in
order to make absolute judgments about whether a particular model applies
to a particular target system, for the purpose of this paper it will be enough
to make comparative judgments between two sets of models for which the
same standards are being applied.
The term “generality” is often used ambiguously by theoreticians. The
ambiguity consists in two different senses of generality we might recognize.
One sense of generality has to do with how many actual target systems a
model applies to. The other has to do with how many logically possible target
systems a model applies to. Let us distinguish between a-generality and
p-generality which track these two senses. A-generality is a measure of the
number of actual target systems a particular model applies to. P-generality
is a measure of how many logically possible target systems a particular model
applies to.
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5 Tradeoff Between Precision and Generality
The easiest way to explain the relationship between precision and generality
is to begin with an intuitive explanation and then develop this explanation
in more detail. The intuitive idea is that when a model description is more
precise, it picks out a smaller set of models. This smaller set of models applies
to fewer target systems. If, on the other hand, the model description turns
out to be imprecise in the way it picks out models, then the description will
pick out a larger set of models. Since the set of models is larger, these models
will apply to many more target systems. I think that we can understand the
tradeoff between precision and generality roughly in this way, but to further
articulate this point, we will have to consider precision’s relationship to p-
generality and a-generality individually.
5.1 Precision vs. P-generality
In order to assess the relationship between precision and p-generality, let’s
consider two instantiations of the ball and spring model:
Estretch = 2.0± 0.1(r − r0)2 (7)
Estretch = 2.01± 0.01(r − r0)2 (8)
The second instantiation (8) has a greater degree of precision than the first
instantiation (7). Unlike the first instantiation which merely bounds the
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spring constant kb between 1.9 and 2.1, the second instantiation bounds
kb between 2.00 and 2.02. The set of models picked out by the second
instantiation is a proper subset of the models picked out by the first, hence
the second is more precise than the first.
Although we cannot say exactly how many logically possible systems
the two sets of models described by (8) and (7) apply to, we can make a
comparison between them. Since the models described by (8) are a proper
subset of the models described by (7), for any logically possible target system
that a model in the (7) family applies to there will also be a model in the
(8) family that applies to the same target system, but not vice versa. Thus
the (7) family is more p-general than the (8) family. Many more logically
possible bond vibrations exhibit the behavior described with a model picked
out by (7) then by (8).
When we put these results together, we can see that there is a tradeoff
between precision and p-generality. As we make model descriptions more pre-
cise, the models that these descriptions pick out will apply to fewer logically
possible target systems. Precision and p-generality cannot be simultaneously
increased. Thus we can conclude that there is a tradeoff between these two
properties.
5.2 Precision vs. A-generality
Since it is the world along with our standards of evaluation that determines
the a-generality of a model, one might be skeptical that there is any universal
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relationship between precision and a-generality.
It is worth articulating this criticism in more detail, although I think
it overlooks some important conclusions that we can draw about the re-
lationship between precision and a-generality. There is a tradeoff between
precision and p-generality. We know, however, that all of the actual target
systems constitute a very small part of possibility space. If actual systems are
evenly distributed in possibility space, then the tradeoff between precision
and p-generality might also hold for precision and a-generality automati-
cally. However, we do not have any way of knowing a priori that systems
are distributed relatively evenly in this possibility space and hence we have
no reason to conclude that precision trades off against a-generality. Thus
the criticism states that the world will have to tell us in each particular case
whether or not there is a tradeoff between precision and a-generality.
It is correct to insist that only the world can tell us how a-general some
model is. However, some facts about the world may help us determine what
kind of relationship can hold between precision and a-generality for particular
types of models.
This point can be illustrated with the help of a particularly vivid example.
Imagine we were building models of ecosystems. Say that we knew the world
we lived in had extremely complex and heterogenous ecosystems, meaning
that many different kinds of ecosystems were found in the world. If this was
true, as we made our model descriptions more precise, they would pick out
a set of models that applied to fewer and fewer target systems. If the set of
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ecosystems was fairly homogenous, then a very small set of models described
by very precisely instantiated equations could apply to many ecosystems.
Say we lived in a desert world, where essentially the same ecosystem was
repeated over and over again. In whatever way we carved up the world into
discrete ecosystems, a very small set of models with a correspondingly precise
model description would apply very generally in this world. On the other
hand, in a world of varied and complex ecosystems like our own, a small set
of models described by highly precise equations will only apply to a small
number of ecosystems. Thus one factor that a-generality depends on is the
homogeneity of the set of target system the model is intended to apply to.
A-generality also depends on a property that I call scope.
Scope is defined as the aspects of target system(s) intended to be rep-
resented by a model. For example, even within models of ecosystems, we
might restrict our scope to the sizes of populations alone. Here we would
track intrinsic growth and death rates, predator-prey interactions, and other
factors associated with the size of particular populations in an ecosystem.
For example, a model with broader scope might include information about
the foraging behavior of particular populations.
From the point of view of a model user with her intended scope, a set of
target systems can appear more or less similar depending on which factors
are actually included in the scope of the model. For example, in our world,
basic physical phenomena such as gravity and electromagnetism affect ob-
jects in the same way everwhere. Even highly specific models of how these
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phenomena affect particular kinds of target systems can have fairly general
applicability. On the other hand, target systems in the world look a lot more
heterogenous if a model builder’s scope includes the kinds of features often of
interest to chemists — such as the differences one finds as one moves down a
group on the periodic table or as one starts with methanol and adds CH2’s.
These considerations suggest that in certain cases, where either the choice
of intended target systems or the choice of scope ensures homogeneity among
target systems, precision does not trade off against a-generality. Only a very
careful investigation of the extent to which different kinds of scopes affect
homogeneity among target systems could determine whether precision trades
off against a-generality for a particular set of target systems. I think that this
is an extremely worthwhile project, but it will require careful empirical study
of exactly how complex different target phenomena in our world really are.
Another benefit of this detailed study is that we could learn the extent to
which the tradeoff between precision and a-generality is a global phenomenon.
Even without this study, however, we can make a weak claim about the
global relationship between precision and a-generality. We can claim that
precision is an attenuating factor of a-generality. By attenuating factor, I
mean that increases in precision makes the achievement of a-generality more
difficult, but not impossible.
Many of the issues I discussed in connection with the tradeoff between
precision and a-generality are relevant to this claim about attenuation. Of
particular relevance is the relationship between scope and a-generality. For
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any small set of models and set of intended target systems, there is likely to
be some scope that will make this set of models very a-general. However,
it is far more likely that any given scope will result in these models lacking
a-generality. Recall that small sets of models are picked out by highly precise
model descriptions. This means that for many scopes, highly precise model
descriptions will pick out models that lack a-generality. Thus we can conclude
that increasing precision attenuates a-generality.
6 Generality and Chemical Explanation
We now return to the connection between qualitative models and chemical
explanation. Recall the passage I quoted from the physical organic chemistry
textbook, which suggested a norm for model building: If you want to generate
chemical explanations, then you should build qualitative models. Since we
are only considering one aspect of qualitative modelling, precision, we could
read this norm as suggesting that one could rationally sacrifice some precision
in model descriptions in order to gain explanatory power. I believe that my
analysis of the tradeoff between precision and a-generality gives us some of the
resources we need to explain this assertion. The key comes from associating
generality with explanatory power.
Many philosophers have thought generality is an important desideratum
for scientific explanation. This is true of philosophers who base their entire
account of explanation on unity and generality (Kitcher, 1981 and Friedman,
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1974), logical empiricists (Hempel, 1965), and some modern causal theorists
(Strevens, forthcoming). I will not defend the connection between explana-
tory depth and generality in this essay, but I do want to note that many
theorists giving quite different accounts of explanation have seen generality
as an important explanatory desideratum.
There are also reasons internal to chemistry for considering generality
to be an explanatory virtue. Chemists are often interested in trends across
similar but slightly different target systems. For example, chemists might
want to explain the similarities in molecular structure for a set of alcohol
molecules. General models can be used to explain the structure of these
molecules in a unified way, allowing us to make relevant comparisons between
them using the same basic framework. If we build highly precise models which
are not very general, then this explanatory value for comparing trends would
be lost.
Given that generality is an explanatory virtue in chemistry, we can justify
part of the model building norm defended by Hoffmann, Carroll, and other
theorists. Sacrificing precision typically allows us to gain generality. This
sacrifice is therefore a good way to increase an explanatory virtue, namely
generality. If we have the goal of trying to offer an explanation of the struc-
ture and dynamics of a target system, then it is rational to idealize by sacri-
ficing precision to gain generality and thereby increase the explanatory power
of our models.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, I have discussed an important component of modern theoret-
ical chemistry which focuses on the construction of highly idealized models.
“Qualitative theory” connects the construction and use of idealized models
with an increase in explanatory power. In this paper, I examined only one
aspect of idealization. I argued that precision trades off with p-generality
such that one cannot simultaneously increase both of these properties. I also
argued that precision attenuates a-generality, meaning that a high degree of
precision makes the achievement of a-generality more difficult. These rela-
tionships are important because they can help us defend a model-building
norm that associates explanatory depth with the sacrifice of precision, which
is one aspect of qualitative theorizing.
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